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The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of
Food and Drugs
Section 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act1 declares the
false advertisement2 of food, drugs, cosmetics or devices to be an
unfair or deceptive act and, as such, a violation of law that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is mandated to prevent. 3 Although the FTC's principal means of enforcing section 12 is the
administrative procedure leading to a cease and desist order, 4 it also
possesses supplementary authority under section 13 (a) of the Act
to seek an injunction against an advertisement pending initiation and
completion of the cease and desist procedure. 5
Two judicial decisions in the early 1950s construing the FTC's
section 13 (a) power6 produced a conflict that has not been resolved
either by later courts 7 or by the amendments to section 13 enacted
in 1973. 8 The dispute basically concerns the depth of the courts'
inquiry into whether an advertisement violates- section 12 and the,l
applicability of traditional equitable concepts in the context of the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975).
2. Section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. ,§ 55(a)(l) (1970), defines false advertisement, for the purpose of section 12, to be "an advertisement, other than labeling,
which is misleading in a material respect."
3. The basic mandate of the Federal Trade Commission is "to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5(a)6, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
4. See text at notes 9-12 infra.
5. The FrC is authorized to petition in a federal district court for an injunction
whenever it has "reason to believe"
1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is engaged in, or is about to
engage in, the dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of any advertisement [in violation of § 12] and
'
2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission . . . and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set
aside by the court on review, or the order of the Commission to cease and
desist made thereon has become final . . . , would be to the interest of the
public. . . .
The statute then directs that "upon proper showing a temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond." Federal Trade Commission Act
§ 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970).
6. FrC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), noted in 65
HARv. L. REV. 349 (1951); FrC v. National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Md. 1952).
.
.
1. Compare FrC v. National Commn. on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976), with FrC v. Simeon Management Corp.,
532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
8. The amendment to section 13 was adopted as section 408(f) of the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975).
See Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive Powers Under the Alaska
Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1975).

745

746

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:745

statutory injunction procedure. This Note contends that the legislative history of pertinent provisions of the Act suggests an appropriate
resolution of the conflict through a two-step approach that would
relax the scrutiny ordinarily accorded petitions for preliminary relief
but would not dispense with the same general considerations that have
traditionally been used in equitable matters.
Issuance of an injunction alters the normal course of the cease
and desist procedure, 9 which is initiated when the Commission issues
a complaint. To support a complaint, the FTC must have "reason
to believe" that a violation of the Act has occurred, and it must
"appear to the Commission" that a proceeding to terminate the violation is in the public interest. 10 If the respondent chooses to contest
the matter, a hearing is held before an administrative law judge,
with the staff of the Commission prosecuting the case. 11 The administrative law judge may dismiss the complaint or issue a cease and
desist order, but either result may theri be appealed to the full Commission, which acts as an appellate tribunal. An unsuccessful re0 spondent has the right to challenge the Commission's decision in the
federal courts of appeal.1 2
An injunction is useful in certain cases because the cease and
desist order has no effect until the entire appellate process is completed. If the order is not appealed to the courts, the penalties provided for violation of a "final" order become effective only at the
expiration of the time permitted for filing an appeal. 13 If the order
9. For a succinct description of the FTC's other regulatory powers, see Posner,
Regulation of Advertising by the FTC, 11 EVALUATIVE STUDIES 12-14 (1973).
10. § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45{b) (Supp. V 1975). The requirement that the Commission issue a complaint only where "it shall appear to the Commission that a
proceeding . . . would be in the interest of the public was early construed as a limitation of the Commission's jurisdiction to those cases where the public interest is "specific and substantial." FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929). It was held in
the same case that the "Commission exercises a broad discretion" as to whether
a proceeding would be in the public interest, but that its determination on the matter
is subject to judicial review. 280 U.S. at 28, 30. Courts today, however, generally
require only that the matter not be trivial. See Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 439, 483-87 (1964 ).
11. The mechanics of the hearing procedure may be found in 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.413.46 (1976). In general, a hearing is in the form of a trial, and the parties "have
the right of due notice, cross examination, presentation of evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all other rights essential to a fair hearing." 16 C.F.R. § 3.41
(c) (1976).
12. Review of the decision of the courts of appeal is available to both parties
by a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Provisions concerning judicial review
of Commission orders are set out in Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 15
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
13. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(g), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g)
(1970), a cease and desist order becomes final
(1) upon expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if such
petition has been duly filed within such time; . . • or (2) upon the expiration
of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari; . . . or (3) upon the
denial of a petition for certioran; • • • or ( 4) upon the expiration of thirty
days from the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court, if such
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is challenged, the penalties take effect only after all avenues of
judicial review are exhausted. There may thus be a period of months
or, not uncommonly, years between the issuance of a complaint and
the respondent's incurring of liability for a violation. 14 The injunctive authority of section 13(a) was intended to enable the Commission to provide more immediate protection for the consuming public.15
The terms of the statute identify two general issues as relevant to
the propriety of an injunction. The Commission is authorized to
petition in a federal district court for an injunction whenever it has
"reason to believe" that a violation of section 12 has occurred or is
imminent, and that an injunction pending initiation and completion
of the cease and desist procedure is in the public interest. 16 "Upon
proper showing'' by the Commission, the court is instructed to grant
the injunction.17
It is the content -of the "proper showing" requirement that has
produced judicial conflict. 18 The first case construing the phrase,
Court directs that the order of the Commission be affirmed . . . .
A respondent who violates a final cease and desist order becomes·liable
the
civil penalties provided in section 5([), 15 U.S.C. § 45([) (Supp. V 1975).
14. Illustrative of the potential for delay is FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191
F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), in which a complaint was issued in August, 1949, yet
a cease and desist order was not entered until October, 1952. That order was subsequently challenged in the Seventh Circuit and thus became "final" only after affirmance by that court in November, 1953. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d
382 (7th Cir. 1953), modified, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
15. The injunctive authority of section 13(a) was added to the Commission's
powers by the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52
Stat. 111 (1938). See text at note 126 infra.
16. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). See
note 5 supra. A literal reading of the requirement of section 13(a)(2), that an
injunction "pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission" be in the public
interest, would suggest that the Commission's authority to seek an injunction exists
only prior to the issuance of a complaint. See, f!.g., Legislation-The Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1938, 39 CoLUM. L. REV. 259, 268 (1939). It is now established, however, that that authority persists throughout the administrative phase of
the· cease and desist procedure. See FTC v. National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp.
340, 343-44 (D. Md. 1952).
17. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). See
note 5 supra.
18. There have been only four cases in which the content of a "proper showing"
has been defined. That rather sparse judicial history is explained by the Commis~
sion's sporadic use of the remedy. By far the majority of actions under the statute
were brought within the first three years after the adoption of section 13(a). Those
early cases resulted in the Commission obtaining injunctions in 37 of its first 38
attempts. However, no consensus emerged from those cases as to the showing the
Commission was required to make to obtain an injunction. The Commission's success suggests that the courts relaxed the generally strict standards of equity, yet the
decrees commonly included such traditional findings as that "immediate and irreparable injury" would result in the absence of relief. See, e.g., FTC v. Chapman Health
Prods., 30 F.T.C. 1687, 1688 (N.D. Ohio 1939). In the one early case in which
the Commission failed to obtain an injunction, the court clearly did not relax equitable standards, basing its ruling on the presence of defense affidavits "denying the
equities of the bill." FTC v. American Medicinal Prods., 30 F.T.C. 1683, 1684
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FTC v. Rhodes Pharmaca/, Co., 19 involved advertisement of the aspirin

product "Imdrin" as a rheumatism and arthritis treatment. The
district court, without specific reference to the terms of section 13 (a),
appeared to conclude that issuance of an injunction under the statute
was governed by the same standards that controlled a private litigant's
ability -to obtain preliminary relief. 2 ° Faced as it was with competing affidavits from the parties, the court held that, when a plaintiff's contentions "are seriously disputed, an injunction will not
issue." 21 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the district court's reliance on the standards of private litigation and held,
instead, that "the standards of the public interest" were the appropriate measure for a statutory injunction, 22 and, further, that those
(S.D. Cal. 1940). But cf. Koch Laboratories v. FTC, 34 F.T.C. 1867 (E.D. Mich.
1942), appeal dismissed and opinion set out, 38 F.T.C. 931 (6th Cir. 1944) (injunction entered despite existence of "honest controversy" where harm threatened to public by continuation of advertisements outweighed harm threatened to defendants by
an injunction).
19. 1950-51 Trade Cas. 67,782 (N.D. Ill.), revd., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951).
20. While the general principle of equity is that the grant of a preliminary injunction is left to the discretion of the court, three basic tests are typically applied
to indicate the propriety of such relief. The court must consider, first, whether the
petitioner has demonstrated a probable ultimate right to the relief requested, second,
whether the petitioner has shown a probable danger that that right will be defeated
unless an injunction is issued, and, third, whether the damage to the petitioner in
the absence of an injunction clearly outweighs any harm which may be caused by
issuance of an injunction. See J. MOORE & H. FINK, 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
,r 65.04(1), at 65-39 to 65-45 (2d ed. 1975). Courts, however, are much less inclined to issue a preliminary injunction where, as in Rhodes, the sole support for
the petitioner's claim is the testimony of affidavits. See, e.g., Sims v. Greene, 161
F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947). Where affidavits are contradicted by counter-affidavits,
courts will generally not attempt to resolve factual disputes and "the proper exercise
of discretion will normally call for a denial" of injunctive relief. See J. MOORE
& H. FINK, supra, ,r 65.04(3), at 65-63; cf. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline &
French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1953) ("[A] preliminary injunction may be granted upon affidavits. A requirement of oral testimony would in
effect require a full hearing on the merits and would thus defeat one of the purposes
of a preliminary injunction which is to give speedy relief from irreparable injury").
21. 1950-51 Trade Cas. at 64,314. The analysis of the district court was applied
in an earlier action involving section 13(a). See FTC v. American Medicinal Prods.,
30 F.T.C. 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
22. 191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951) (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 331 (1943) ). The court's reliance on Hecht is somewhat peculiar, since, taken
broadly, Hecht argues for the extension of equitable principles to injunctions authorized by statute. The statute involved in Hecht was section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, and was considerably more peremptory in its language than
section 13(a). See 321 U.S. at 326, 327. The issue in the case was a federal court's
power to deny ai:i injunction where the sole requirement of the statute, proof of
a violation of the Price Control Act, had been established. An jnjunction had been
denied in an action brought before a district court because of evidence that the
violation had been inadvertent and had been thereafter discontinued. That judgment
was reversed by the District of Columbia Circuit, which· held that the mandatory
language of section 205(a) required issuance of an injunction once proof of a violation was shown. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the appeals court and remanded the case to that court to determine whether the district court had abused
its discretion in dismissing the complaint. See 321 U.S. at 331. The Court con-
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standards were set by the specific terms of the statute. 28 The court
found no statutory language or legislative history that defined the required "proper showing," 24 but nevertheless ruled that the only issue
that should have been before the district court was whether the
Commission had shown "reason to believe" that the advertisements
were false or misleading.25 Accordingly, the court remanded the case
for a determination on that issue.
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 13 (a) discounts
as an independent issue the statute's "public interest" requirement. 26
The opinion suggests two alternative grounds for that result. The
first derives from the court's statement that protection of the public
from misleading advertisements is in the public interest,27 which
implies that evidence of an advertisement's misleading nature is itself
evidence that an injunction against the advertisement is in the public
interest. The second can be gleaned from the court's assertion that
the Commission possesses a "broad discretion" as to whether a "proceeding" is in the public interest, 28 which implies that presumptive
validity will be given the Commission's judgment that an injunction
serves the public interest. In effect, the court's interpretation of
section 13 ( a) treats the public interest requirement of the statute
as a perfunctory rather than substantive aspect of the Commission's
obligation to make a "proper showing," and correspondingly limits the
court's inquiry into the appropriateness of an injunction to the question of an advertisement's falsity.
The conclusions of Rhodes were brought into question in FTC v.
National Hea/,th Aids, lnc., 29 in which the FI'C sought an injunction
to suppress allegedly misleading advertisements for the vitamin supplement "NHA-Complex." Rejecting the Commission's assertion of a
"reason to believe" standard, the district court concluded that "it was
hardly the intention of Congress to require a district court in the
exercise of the extraordinary remedy of injunction to proceed affireluded that section 205(a), despite its mandatory language, afforded "a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under this emergency legislation in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities
of the public interest . . .." 321 U.S. at 330. See Note, The Statutory Injunction
as a11 Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 51 YALE L.J. 1023, 1027-28 (1948).
23. 191 F.2d at 747.
24. 191 F.2d at 747.
25. The court stated:
The District Court was not required to find the charges made to be true,
but to find reasonable cause to believe them to be true . . . . This is to say,
in the instant case, the court had only to resolve the narrow issue of whether
there was "reasonable cause" to believe that the alleged violation had taken
place.
191 F.2d at 748.
26. See text at note 16 supra.
27. 191 F.2d at 747.
28. 191 F.2d at 747.
29. 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
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matively merely on the basis of the reasonable belief of the administrative agency." 30 Instead, citing the substantial private interests that
an injunction could affect, the court declared that its decision should
be based on general equitable considerations. 31 Its eventual action
reflects a two-part test, in which it independently evaluated the
advertisements' accuracy and determineq the potential injury to the
public in the event of their continuance. Applying an evidently
stricter standard on the falsity issue than was mandated in Rhodes,
the court found section 12 violations to be "clearly established."
Then, finding evidence of possible physical and pecuniary harm
should the advertisements continue, the court concluded that an injunction was indeed warranted. 32
The first case to consider the uncertainty left by the decisions in
Rhodes and National Health Aids was FTC v. Sterling Drug, lnc., 33
in which the Commission sought to restrain the makers of Bayer
Aspirin from allegedly misrepresenting the findings of a governmentsponsored study of pain relievers. 34 In an ambiguous opinion that
appeared to endorse both the Rhodes position and a stricter requirement that there be "reasonable certainty" of ultimate Commission
success on the merits, the district court denied an injunction. 35
The latter requirement was the basis for the FTC's appeal in
which it contended that the "reason to believe" standard of Rhodes
was the appropriate test. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed
the decision because it was not convinced that the district court had
in fact applied the higher standard, and also because it concluded
30. 108 F. Supp. at 346.
31. The court stated that "the action of the Court should be based on the general
considerations that properly apply in the issuance of preliminary injunctions." 108
F. Supp. at 346.
32. 108 F. Supp. at 348.
33. 215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
34. The basic conclusion of the study was that there were no significant differences in the effectiveness of the five products tested (Bayer, St. Joseph's Aspirin,
Bufferin, -Excedrin and Anacin). The manufacturers of Bayer, which was priced
lower than its competitors, were understandably pleased by those findings and did
not hesitate to present them in their advertisements. Though the study had been
authorized and financed by the Commission itself, one of the Commission's complaints was that the advertisements referred to a government sponsored medical team.
See 215 F. Supp. at 330-32.
35. In evaluating the Commission's request for an injunction under section 13(a),
the district court, while making no reference to the conflict between Rhodes and
National Health Aids, appeared at least partially to endorse Rhodes, for it cited that
case in concluding: "Of course, in evaluating the falsity of the -advertisement, the
Court in this proceeding has only to resolve whether there was reasonable cause
to believe that the alleged violation had taken place." 215 F. Supp. at 332. Howev~r,
in ultimately concluding that the Commission had failed to establish such "reasonable
cause to believe," the court rather confusingly noted that the law was "well established" that a preliminary injunction would not issue unless the court was "convinced
with reasonable certainty that the complainant would succeed at the final hearing."
215 F. Supp. at 332.
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independently that the Commission had not even managed to establish
"reason to believe" that the advertisements were false. 36 Consequently, the court did not have to consider the validity of the Rhodes
standard. It did, however, suggest that courts retained some latitude
even under Rhodes, stating that "[n]ot even the Commission contends that in· a proceeding under section 13 (a) the judge is merely
a rubber stamp, stripped of the power to exercise independent judgment on the issue of the Commission's 'reason to believe.' " 37
Sterling Drug was the last appellate consideration of section 13 (a)
before the amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act in
1973.38 The major impact of the amendments, which did not affect
section 13 (a) itself, was to add section 13 (b) 39 authorizing injunctive relief for violation of any law enforced by the Commis-:
sion. 40 Section 13 (b) empowered the Commission to seek preliminary injunctions under the same "reason to believe" standard
set out in section 13 (a), 41 but instead of directing that an injunction "shall be issued" upon "proper showing,"42 the new provision
stated that an injunction "may be granted" upon a "proper showing
that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest."43
36. 317 F.2d at 678.
37. 317 F.2d at 677. While the Second Circuit stated that the Commission was
obliged to demonstrate its "reason to believe" both that the advertisement was false
and that an injunction would be in the public interest, 317 F.2d at 677, it did not,
because of its findings concerning the advertisement's falsity, suggest the sort of evidence that would have been required to establish that an injunction would have been
in th~ public interest. The Commission had supported its petition with allegations
that consumers were misled by the Bayer advertisements, to their "irreparable injury,"
and further, that Bayer's competitors would respond in kind if the advertisements
were continued. 317 F.2d at 676. Since the study had indeed concluded that there
were no significant differences among the various pain relievers, it is not clear why
either of those consequences was thought to be sufficiently threatening to require
that the Bayer advertisements be immediately suppressed.
38. See note 8 supra.
39. The pre-existing section 13(b) authorized the court to exempt from the scope
of an injunction a particular issue of a publication if the injunction "would delay
the delivery of such issue after the regular time therefor. . •." That provision was
retained but moved to section 13(c) by the 1973 Amendment.
40. Application of section 13(a) is limited to violations of section 12, see note 5
supra, and thus the addition of section 13 (b) represented a significant expansion
of the Commission's authority. See Halverson, supra note 8. Prior to the adoption
of section 13 (b), however, the Commission possessed the infrequently used authority
to seek injunctions against violations of the labelling acts. See Wool Products Labelling Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 68(e) (1970); Fur Products Labelling Act § 9(b),
15 U.S.C. § 69(g) (1970); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act § 8, 15 U.S.C.
§ 70(f) (1970).
41. § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975).
42. § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970).
43. § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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The adoption of section 13 (b) has had a substantial impact upon
subsequent interpretations of section 13(a), primarily because of the
Conference Committee Report's 44 interpretation of prior case law.
Specifically, the Report stated that the more explicit definition in
section 13 (b) of a "proper showing" was not intended "to impose a
totally new standard of proof different from that which is now required of the Commission,"45 but rather was intended
to define the duty of the courts to exercise independent judgment on
the propriety of issuance of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. This new language is intended to codify the
decisional law of Federal Trade Commission v. National Health
Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340, and Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d1 669, and similar cases which have defined the
judicial role to include the exerci~e of such independent judgment. 40

The first case to consider section 13 (a) in light of the 1973
amendments arose in the Seventh Circuit, which was also the origin
of the Rhodes decision. In FTC v. National Commission on Egg
Nutrition, 47 the FTC sought to suppress advertisements that denied
the existence of any credible scientific evidence linking egg consumption with the incidence of heart disease. It asserted the continuing
validity of the Rhodes doctrine, 48 but that contention was rejected by
the district court, which stated that Rhodes had been disapproved in
National Health Aids and that Congress, in light of the Conference
Report to the 1973 amendments, viewed the latter case as the prevailing law. 49 Significantly, since the Conference Report had identified the language of section 13 (b) as an intended codification of
National Health Aids' interpretation of section 13(a), the court concluded that
[n]otwithstanding the differences in statutory language between
section 13(a) and section 13(b), I am of the opinion that the phrase
"proper showing" has the same meaning when used both in section
13(a) and section 13(b), . . . and that within that meaning is
encompassed the Commission's burden of at least showing the
necessary public interest, a favorable balance of the equities, and
the probable chance of success. 50

In applying the approach outlined in that conclusion, the court, after
finding that the Commission had shown "reason to believe" that the
advertisements were misleading, 51 focused its attention on the public
44. CONF. REP. No. 93-924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533 [hereinafter cited as CoNF. REP.].
45. Id. at 2533.
46. Id.
47. 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1[ 60,246 (N.D. Ill. 1974), revd., 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1975).
48. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966-67.
49. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966.
50. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966.
51. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,969.
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interest question. It concluded, after an analysis of the egg market,
that continuation of the advertisements during cease and desist proceedings would have no effect on the total quantity of eggs consumed. 52 Moreover, the court held that an injunction might have the
harmful effects of restricting useful public debate on the cholesterol
issue and damaging the financial interests of the respondents. 53 After
balancing these factors against the likelihood that more consumers
would be misled if the advertisements were continued, the court held
that the Commission had failed to meet its burden as to the public
interest, and denied an injunction. 54
Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit totally rejected the district court's
analysis. 55 With regard to the 1973 amendments, the court held that
Congress' addition of section 13 (b),
[b]y providing the traditional equity standards . . . and the permissive
"may" in (b), while leaving (a) without those standards and with
its peremptory "shall," indicated an intention that those standards
be applied in proceedings under (b) but not in those under (a), and
no intention that the judicial interpretations of (a) should be affected by the amendment. 56

Accordingly, the court held that its earlier opinion in Rhodes remained
the authoritative interpretation of section 13 (a), and that the district
court erred in going beyond the question of whether there was "reason
to believe" that the advertisements were false. 57 Because the district
court had expressly found that the FTC had met that burden, 58 the
Seventh Circuit ordered that an injunction be granted. 59
52. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970.
53. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970.
54. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970. The court made additional, though unelaborated, findings that the Commission had failed to establish the probability of its
ultimate success and a favorable balance of equities. In light of the express balancing of interests the court conducted in determining that an injunction would not
be in the public interest, it is unclear what the second of those findings adds to
the court's holding other than to repeat the statutory language of section 13(b).
55. 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975).
56. 517 F.2d at 488-89. Presumably referring to the statements in the Conference Report, the court asserted that its inference as to Congress' intentions was not
refuted by the amendment's "somewhat ambiguous legislative history." 517 F.2d at
489.
57. 517 F.2d at 489.
58. In an oblique reference to the "public interest" issue, the court stated: ''The
Commission also showed that it believed an injunction would be in the best interest
of the public, a statement which the District Court credited to the extent that more
people were likely to be misled if the pronouncements were permitted to continue."
517 F.2d at 489. The court thus appeared to adopt the analysis of its earlier decision
in Rhodes, suggesting that to the extent the "public interest" requirement of section
13(a) was not discretionary with the Commission, it was satisfied by a showing
that the advertisements were misleading. See text at note 26 supra.
59. 517 F.2d at 490. Chief Judge Fairchild argued in a concurring opinion that
advertising, at least where it expressed an opinion on a "genuine controversy," was
protected by the first amendment, and that, accordingly, "reason to believe" an advertisement was false was an insufficient basis for an injunction. He was able to concur
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The hope that the conflict over section 13 (a) had been resolved
by National Commission on Egg Nutrition was quic~ly frustrated by
FTC v. Simeon Management Corp. 60 In that case, the Commission
sought to enjoin advertisements for a weight reduction program that
employed a drug unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration. 01
The district court's confusing opinion evidenced a failure to recognize
the textual differences between sections 13 (a) and 13 (b), 02 and,
applying the standards of subsection (b), the court denied the injunction. 63
On appeal by the Commission, the Ninth Circuit held that the
showings required under sections 13(a) and 13(b) were "essentially
the same," 64 and that the district court had therefore not erred in
applying section 13 (b) standards to the Commission's injunction
request. 65 The court suggested that, in light of the Conference
in the issuance of the injunction in this case, however, because he thought the advertisements had been shown to be clearly misleading. 517 F.2d at 490-91. For a
discussion of this issue, see note 65 infra.
60. 391 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd., 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. The Commission's request for an injunction was brought under both section
13(a) and section 13(b), apparently out of a concern that advertisements for a
weight reducing program employing a. drug, as opposed to advertisements for the
drug itself, would not fall within the scope of section 12. Because the district court
held that the advertisements were within section 12, 391 F. Supp. at 703-04, the
standards of section 13(a) became relevant to the propriety of an injunction.
62. Judge Orrick appeared to assume that the more explicit definition of a "propel'
showing" found in section 13(b) was also present in section 13(a). With reference
to the conflicting interpretations of section 13(a), Judge Orrick stated:
Considering that the statute specifically directs the Court to weigh the equities
and considering the extraordinary and important nature of injunctive relief, I
am of the view that the District Court must do more than determine if the
administrative agency had reasonable cause to believe that the alleged violation
had taken place.
391 F. Supp. at 700.
63. In ruling that the Commission had failed to make the "proper showing" required for an injunction, Judge Orrick first found that "the FTC [did] not have
a strong likelihood of establishing at the administrative proceedings . . • that the
respondent's advertisement are false or misleading. . . ." 391 F. Supp. at 704. He
then concluded that the equities also weighed against injunctive relief since there
was no evidence that the weight treatment harmed the public and an injunction would
likely harm the operators and patrons of the program. 391 F. Supp. at 707.
Some three months after that decision, the administrative law judge hearing the
case against Simeon Management granted a modified version of the cease and desist
order requested by the Commission. See Simeon Management Corp., FTC Docket
No. 8996 (June 18, 1975), summarized 3 TRADE REG. REP. CCH ,i 20,930. Subsequently the Commission petitioned Judge Orrick for an injunction pending its appeal
of his earlier decision, but that request was denied.
64. 532 F.2d at 713. In arguing that a more lenient standard governed issuance
of jnjunctions under section 13 (a), the Commission relied on the Seventh Circuit's
decision in National Commn. on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), which
was issued subsequent to the district court's action in Simeon.
65. The Ninth Circuit noted that, by concluding that section 13(a) required the
courts to exercise "independent judgment" as to the propriety of an injunction, it
had avoided the constitutional problems that would be raised by the adoption of
a "reason to believe" standard. 532 F.2d at 713. The court suggested that recent
decisions of the Supreme Court had indicated that commercial speech was not im•
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Report's express statement that section 13 (b) was an intended
codification of the decisions in National Health Aids and Sterling
Drug, Congress considered the courts' function under either section to
be the exercise of "independent judgment" on the appropriateness
mune from the protections of the first amendment, and that procedural safeguards
were vitally important where potentially protected speech was subjected to prior restraint. The court suggested that adequate safeguards would be lacking if courts
were required to enjoin an advertisement simply because the "FTC claimed it was
false." 532 F.2d at 713. While the court's concern that there be safeguards in the
operation of section 13(a) is clearly legitimate, its presentation of the constitutional
problem is somewhat distorted. Neither Rhodes nor National Commn. on Egg Nutrition suggested that a "reason to believe" standard enabled the Commission to have
an advertisement enjoined solely on the basis of its "claim" that the advertisement
was false. The message of those cases was instead that courts should apply a standard of reasonableness in proceedings under section 13(a) rather than ihe traditionally
higher standards required by equity. Moreover, one of the cases cited by the Ninth
Circuit as representing the constitutionally required independent judgment was
Sterling Drug, in which the Second Circuit expressly confined itself to a determination of whether there was "reason to believe" the advertisements in question were
false. See text at note 36 supra. Thus it is far from clear that a "reason to believe"
standard is inconsistent with the safeguards the Ninth Circuit deemed constitutionally
required for section 13(a).
This is not, however, to suggest that the problem raised is frivolous. Other courts
have expressed similar concern. See note 59 supra. The Supreme Court has noted
that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (emphasis original). In Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), the Court suggested that the crucial requirement in a valid
system of prior restraint was prompt judicial determination as to whether the expression restrained was within the protection of the first amendment. That requirement was examined in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), where one of the issues
was the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the postmaster general to obtain
a court order permitting the detention of an individual's in-coming mail upon a showing of "probable cause to believe" that the individual was using the mails in the
sale of obscene materials. The Court overturned the statute, holding that a judicial
determination as to "probable cause," rather than as to the question of obscenity
itself, was an insufficient basis upon which to abrogate the first amendment protection of the use of the mails. 400 U.S. at 420. Assuming both that "reason to
believe" does not differ significantly from "probable cause to believe," and that
Blount continues to be valid, the question of whether operation of section 13(a)
on a "reason to believe" standard is constitutionally permissible would seem to hinge
on the extent to which the first amendment protects advertising. As noted by the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that commercial speech
is not outside the protection of the first amendment. Yet the Court has also suggested
that commercial speech may not be afforded all the protections awarded to other
forms of expression. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 n.24 (1976), Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, stated:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. . . .
rr:Jhe greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech . . . may make
it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker. . . . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior
restraints. (citations omitted)
While Justice Blackrnun's rather tentative statement does not resolve the question
raised by the Ninth Circuit, it would seem that any conclusion as to the unconstitutionality of the Rhodes interpretation of section 13(a) is somewhat premature.
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of an injunction. 66 On that basis, the court affirmed the denial of
an injunction. 67
As the more recent cases indicate, the present conflict revolves
around the meaning of two congressional actions-the enactment of
section 13 (a) in 1938 and the adoption of section 13 (b) thirty-five
years later. Those cases have not, however, examined the legislative
intent behind the former enactment but have instead concentrated
upon the Conference Report accompanying the adoption of section
13 (b) . That focus is misplaced, for Congress' action in 1973 was
not only three and a half decades after the passage of the first provision68 but was also decidedly ambiguous. While there is language
in the Conference Report that purports to interpret cases involving
section 13 (a), the essential purpose of that language is to illustrate
the standards intended to govern section 13 (b) . Compounding the
difficulty is the fact that the two cases cited by the Report, National
Heal.th Aids and Sterling Drug, stand for somewhat different propositions. 69 Further, although Congress admittedly did not consider
the standards for section 13 (b) to be "totally new" as opposed to
those for section 13 (a), it does not follow that the standards were
intended to be identical. Had that been its purpose, Congress' refusal to simultaneously amend or abolish section 13 (a) would have
been irrational. Section 13 (b) authorizes the Commission to seek
preliminary relief against alleged violations of any law it enforces,
including the section 12 violations to which section 13(a) is limited. 70
If the standards for each subsection were to be interpreted as identical,
section 13 (a) would become entirely redundant, giving the Commission no authority it would not otherwise possess under 13 (b). Since
66. The court acknowledged that the Conference Report represented a retrospective interpretation of section 13(a), but, citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358
U.S. 84 (1958), and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the court
held that the interpretation of a statute by the drafters of subsequent legislation is
entitled to "significant weight." 532 F.2d at 713. The court's use of these cases
to defeat the Commission's interpretation of section 13(a), however, is somewhat
disingenuous, since the major point in each decision was the weight to be given
a longstanding interpretation of a statute by the agency authorized to administer
it. As the Supreme Court stated in Bell:
(A] court may accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed
on a statute by an agency charged with its administration. This is especially
so where Congress has re-enacted the statute without pertinent change. In these
circumstances, congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.
416 U.S. at 274-75. Those comments seem particularly appropriate in light of Congress' failure to "revise or repeal" the Commission's interpretation of section 13(a)
in 1973.
67. 532 F.2d at 717.
68. See note 66 supra.
69. See text at notes 31, 36 supra.
70. Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 13(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(a) (1970),
53(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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Congress was clearly aware of section 13 (a) and the textual difference between it and 13 (b), 71 it seems difficult to conclude that identity
of standards was its purpose. Moreover, the fact that section 12
violations, in contrast to violations of other laws enforced by the
Commission, may involve physical as well as financial injuries, 72
lends credence to a conclusion that Congress intended a less vigorous
standard to control issuance of an injunction in that context. 73 Thus,
the enactment of section 13 (b) would seem to have raised rather
than resolved questions with respect to 13(a).
The courts' failure to examine the legislation that produced section 13 (a) is unfortunate. 74 Although the elements that comprise
a "proper showing" are not expressly defined in the statute or its
legislative history, the context in which the section developed makes
Congress' intent reasonably apparent.
Section 13(a) was but one aspect of the Wheeler-Lea Act's75
general redefinition of the FTC's role in the regulation of food and
drug advertising, 76 and grew out of a prolonged congressional debate
as to whether responsibility for that regulation was to be in the
Commission or in the Food and Drug Administration. Although
prior to 1938 neither agency had possessed express statutory authority to regulate such advertising, 77 the Federal Trade Commission
had assumed jurisdiction on the basis of court decisions. 78 The
Commission's detractors contended that it was ill-equipped to handle
this responsibility. They asserted specifically that its enforcement
powers and procedures were unrelated to the protection of consumer
interests, 79 particularly since there were no direct penalties for viola11. See text at note 45 supra.
12. See note 102 infra.
73. That argument was raised by the Commission in Simeon, 532 F.2d at 713.
74. The only cases that expressly considered the intentions of the drafters of
the Wheeler-Lea Act were Rhodes and National Health Aids. The Seventh Circuit
in Rhodes stated that there was no indication in section 13(a) or in its legislative
history of what was intended by the "proper showing" requirement. 191 F.2d at
747. Judge Chesnut in National Health Aids noted only that the phrase was undefined in the statute. 108 F. Supp. at 346.
75. 52 Stat. 116 (1938), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-55 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. V 1975). See generally Lindahl, The Federal Trade Commission Act As
Amended In 1938, 41 J. POLITICAL EcoN. 497 (1939).
76. See text at note 99 infra.
77. The FDA's jurisdiction was established by the legislation that created it, the
Federal Food and Drugs Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), and the agency's authority to
act was limited to interstate commerce in misbranded or adulterated foods and drugs.
See Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drug Act: A Legal Critique, 1 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 74 (1933 ).
78. The Commission's jurisdiction at the time was limited to "unfair methods
of competition," but courts had held the false advertising of any commodity to be
within the scope of that phrase. See, e.g., FTC v. Winsted Hosiery, 258 U.S. 483
(1922); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
19. See, e.g., 83 CONG. R.Ec. 394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Mapes). There was
substantial dispute at the time concerning the extent of the Commission's responsibili-
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tions of the FTC Act. 80 Because offenders could only be ordered
to cease and desist, it was contended that they had insufficient incentive to comply with the law81-a problem that was believed to
be aggravated by the delays necessary to obtain and enforce such
orders. 82
Legislation to correct these alleged deficiencies was proposed
as part of a general revision of the existing Food and Drug Act,83
and would have placed primary responsibility for regulating food and
drug advertising in the FDA. 84 Among other things, the bill would
ties to the consumer. Although the Commission had since its inception devoted
substantial energies to the eradication of fraudulent advertising, see Posner, supra
note 9, at 11, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931),
held that the Commission's mandate to prevent "unfair methods of competition" limited the agency's jurisdiction to practices that, regardless of their impact upon the
public, were harmful to competitors. Thus the Court overturned a cease and desist
order against drug advertisements that were conceded to be "dangerously misleading"
because there was no evidence that Raladam's competitor's had been harmed. See
Lindahl, supra note 75, at 503.
Despite that holding, the Commission had generally been able to establish its
jurisdiction in consumer fraud cases. As the chairman of the Commission, Erwin
Davis noted: "[I]t is the rarest case in the world, if it ever exists, where the consuming public is adversely affected by false or misleading advertisements that a competitor is not also affected, and consequently we would 'have the requisite showing
of competition." Bus. WEEK, Feb. 13, 1937, at 32.
80. Civil penalties for violations of Commission cease and desist orders were
first established by the Wheeler-Lea Act. See text at note 96 infra. Prior to that
legislation, the Commission had been required to petition the courts for enforcement
of an order, with the contempt power of the court thereafter being the sanction
behind the cease and desist order. See Handler, The Control of False Advertising
Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 91, 104 n.74 (1939). Since
it had been held that the Commission could petition for enforcement of an order
only upon evidence that the order was being violated, a respondent might actually
have to repeat an offense three times before he could be punished: once to justify
issuance of a cease and desist order, a second time to support a petition for enforcement of the order, and a third time to justify imposition of penalties for violation
of the court's decree. See [1928] FTC ANN. REP. 78.
81. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 360 (1935) (statement
of W.G. Campbell, then Chief of the FDA); 83 CONG. R.Ec. 3287 (1938) (remarks
of Sen. Copeland).
82. Since full administrative hearings were required before an order could be entered and the Commission was thereafter required to follow a multi-step enforcement
procedure, see note 80 supra, it was alleged that a deceptive advertiser had ample
opportunity to reap the fruits of his crime and to embark upon a new line of deception before the Commission could lawfully restrain him. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC,
394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Kenney).
83. That legislation was the first of the so-called Copeland bills, named for Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York. The first bill was designated S.1944, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). In the six years in which Congress considered the Copeland legislation, 1933-38, four major revisions followed S.1944: S.2000, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934); S.2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935), and S.5, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). A detailed study of the progress
of those bills through Congress and the political battles that ensued may be found
in Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and
Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 2 (1939).
84. See Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Critique, 1 LAW
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 74 (1933).
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have established civil and criminal penalties for false advertising
to be enforced by the FDA. 85 Subsequent versions of the bill would
have supplemented these powers by enabling the agency to seize
drugs that were "dangerous to health under the conditions of use
prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof,"86 in some cases
without prior judicial determination of the validity of the charge. 87
Strong opposition to the increased powers contained in the legislation prevented passage for several sessions of Congress and forced
a number of revisions. 88 Much of the dispute focused on the provisions relating to advertising, and reflected disagreement over whether
the FTC or the FDA was the appropriate regulatory agency. Some
congressmen considered the Commission's remedial (as opposed to
preventive) procedure the appropriate way to mark the often hazy
line between salesmen's "puffing" and actionable deception. 89 Additionally, while they recognized that the Commission's procedure was
slow, they also felt it was more consistent with notions of fairness 90
and better calculated to ensure that regulation reflected the needs of
industry as well as those of consumers. 91 The FDA, on the other
hand, had gained a reputation among some congressmen as being
arbitrary in its treatment of commercial interests. 92
85. Id. To give force to its prohibition of false advertising, the bill declared
an advertisement to be false if it were untrue in any particular, if it were misleading, if it were contrary to the general agreement of medical opinion or if it
represented directly or by inference or ambiguity that its product had any therapeutic
effect in the treatment of any one of 36 enumerated diseases. The list ranged from
carbuncles to sexual impotence, and the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized
to add to it as he deemed appropriate. Id.
86. S.S, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
87. The FDA possessed authority under the 1906 Act to seize misbranded or
adulterated foods or drugs in interstate ·commerce pursuant to court process. See
Lee, The Enforcement Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 71 (1939). S.1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), would have extended those powers to cover cosmetic and health devices, and would have authorized
"executive" seizures on probable cause where the product was so adulterated as to
be "dangerous to health." See Fisher, supra note 84, at 111-12. S.5, 7th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935), would have extended those powers to advertising by defining as
adulterated a drug that was dangerous by reason of its advertising. See Cavers,
supra note 83, at 39. The "executive" seizure provisions were eventually discarded
in a revision of S.5 (1935). Subsequent versions of the bill would have authorized
the FDA to seize products, but only pursuant to court process.
88. See note 83 supra.
89. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1937).
90. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 398-99 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece).
91. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 401 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Halleck). The concern that legitimate commercial activity not be harassed was consistently expressed
in the congressional debate over the regulation of food and drug advertising. Much
of the opposition to the broad criminal penalties contained in the Copeland legislation reflected visions of the "honest businessman" going to jail for some inadvertent
commercial statement.
92. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 10679 (1936) (remarks of Rep. McCormick). The
frequently expressed criticisms of the FDA reflected primarily a concern that no
formal adversary procedure governed the agency's actions. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc.
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While debate over these proposals continued, 93 Senator Wheeler
of Montana introduced legislation designed to remedy certain defects
in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 94 A major objective of the
bill was to streamline the cumbersome procedure by which the
Commission enforced its orders. 95 It proposed automatic civil
penalties for violations of "final" Commission orders, with finality
based on either the respondent's failure to request judicial review
or the completion of review by the courts. 96 Additionally, the bill
proposed that federal courts of appeals be authorized to enforce
Commission orders pending resolution of an appeal. 97
After passage by the Senate, 98 Representative Lea's House Interstate Commerce Committee added provisions expressly proclaiming
the FTC's jurisdiction over food and drug advertising and expanding
its related regulatory powers. 99 The concept was that of scaled
enforcement: The remedial approach of the FTC's cease and desist
procedure was to be retained, but the Commission would have addi410 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Lea); 83 CONG. REC. 411 (1938) (remarks of Rep.
O'Malley). Suspicions concerning the FDA's methods were reinforced by the decision in Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), in which the Supreme Court
overturned regulations establishing price rates in the meat packing industry and at
the same time criticized the procedures by which these rates were developed.
93. In the course of the debate, a compromise was proposed that nearly resolved
the dispute over the proper agency for the regulation of food and drug advertising.
In May, 1935 the Senate passed S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., which modified some
of the provisions of the original bill. See note 83 supra, while still giving the FDA
jurisdiction over food and drug advertising. See 19 CONG. REc. 8356 (1935). In
June, 1936 the House adopted that bill, but only after amending it so that food
and drug advertising would continue to be policed by the Commission's cease and
desist procedure. See 80 CONG. REc. 10230-10244 (1936). The conferees appointed
to resolve the dispute proposed a compromise that would have only given the FDA
jurisdiction over food and drug advertising affecting health, leaving responsibility for
all other violations to the Commission. See 80 CONG. REC. 10514-10520 (1936).
It was thus contemplated that the stricter provisions of the Copeland bill would be
limited in application to "advertising affecting the public health," 80 CONG. REC.
10676 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Chapman), and that the Commission would regulate
the commercial aspects of food and drug advertising through the cease and desist
procedure. The compromise ultimately failed, however, as the House remained adamant in its refusal to expand the FDA's jurisdiction to include advertising. See
80 CoNG. REC. 10674-80. Although Congress eventually adopted the Copeland Food
and Drug Act in June, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, the law as enacted made no reference
to food and drug advertising, and thus tacitly conceded that regulatory responsibility
would remain with the Commission.
94. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
95. The other major objective of the bill was to reverse the effects of the Raladam
decision, see note 79 supra, by expanding the Commission's jurisdiction to include
"unfair or deceptive acts," thus eliminating the requirement that the Commission
demonstrate injury to competition before it acts. See Lindahl, supra note 75, at
502-03; note 79 supra.
96. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1937).
97. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1937).
98. S.1077 passed the Senate in March, 1937. See 81 CONG. REC. 2087 (1937).
99. The text of S.1077 as modified by the Lea Amendments can be found at
83 CONG, REc. 404 (1938).
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tional power in certain enumerated situations. Accordingly, while
section 12 declared all false advertisements of food or drugs to be
illegal, it was proposed that any of three different responses might
be appropriate depending on the facts of the particular case. 100
First, civil and criminal penalties would be established in section
14 for violations that were either intentional or that involved products
"injurious to health."101 Second, the Commission would be given
authority in section 13 (a) to seek preliminary injunctions against
advertisements alleged to be false when such relief would promote
"the interest of the public."102 Finally, the existing cease and desist
procedure, as modified by the proposals of Senator Wheeler, would
be retained as the appropriate response to violations that were in100. 83 CoNG. REC. 404 (1938). See Note, The Consumer and Federal Regulation of Advertising, 53 HARv. L. REV. 828, 838-39 (1940). Section 12 states:
(a) it shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement
(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely
to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.
(b) The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement within the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be an unfair
or deceptive act or practice in commerce within the meaning of Section 5.
83 CoNG. REc. 405 (1938). The identical provision was eventually enacted, see
text at note 108 supra, and codified at 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975), see note
2.supra.
101. See 83 CoNG. REc. 404 (1938). Although the FTC was not to be authorized to prosecute section 14 offenses, it was intended that the Commission would
conduct the basic investigation and then refer the matter to the Justice Department
for further proceedings. See 83 CONG. REC. 398 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece).
102. See 83 CoNG. REc. 404 (1938). As initially conceived, section 13(a) would
only have applied to advertisements involving products "imminently dangerous to
health." See To Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, Hearings on H.R. 3143
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
59 (1937). During the 1930s, great notoriety attached to a number of cases in
which medicinal products widely distributed to the public had proved to be dangerous.
One such incident occurred during congressional debate over the food and drug legislation, with at least 73 persons dying from a drug called "Elixir Sulfanihide." Section 13(a) was clearly a response to precisely such products that were "imminently
dangerous to health." Although the reasons for the statute's change to a "public
interest" standard are not entirely clear, it was certainly widely assumed that the
Commission's utilization of section 13(a) was to be limited to "emergency" situations, 83 CONG. REC. 399 (1938), where death, 83 CONG. REc. 3290 (1938), or
at least injury, 83 CONG. REc. 392 (1938), were threatened. The Commission's
early use of the remedy would also suggest that understanding of its purpose. Thirtythree of the first 35 actions brought under section 13(a) involved advertisements
of products that were "of a dangerous nature and injurious to health." [1941) FTC
ANN. REP. 102. The other two actions involved "irreparable, pecuniary injury" to
the public and were directed at a multi-state scheme for the sale of cosmetics, in
which consumers were induced to purchase overpriced cosmetics as part of a contest
for a new car and cash prizes. [1940) FTC ANN. REP. 99-100. See FTC v. Thomson-King & Co., 30 F.T.C. 1692 (N.D. Ill.), motion for supersedeas denied, 109
F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1940); FTC v. Winship Corp., 30 F.T.C. 1697 (S.D. Iowa 1940).
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advertent and did not threaten material injury to the public. 103
Opposition developed to the Lea amendments based principally
on the argument that the public needed greater protection from all
forms of false food and drug advertising rather than from merely
the more threatening cases. 104 A proposed amendment would have
established minimum civil penalties for all violations of section 12,
regardless of their impact upon the consumer. 105 There was also
interest in a proposal to require the Commission to seek a preliminary
injunction for all violations of section 12.100 Neither addition, however, was thought to be sufficiently considerate of the needs of business, 107 and the structure devised by the Lea amendments went into
the law intact upon passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938.108
In drafting section 13 (a), Congress isolated two basic issues as
relevant to the propriety of an injunction: whether the advertisement
was false 100 and whether premilinary relief would be in the public
interest. 110 With respect to the first issue, courts have divided over
whether the Commission need only demonstrate "reason to believe"
an advertisement false 111 or whether the Commission must make a
greater showing, such as the "probability of ultimate success" required by the Ninth Circuit in Simeon. 112
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937); 83 CoNo. REC.
398 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece); Lindahl, supra note 75, at 512.
104. See 83 CoNo. REC. 406 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Kenney). At the core
of the argument was the conviction that the cease and desist procedure could not
supply the necessary protection. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
23-26 (1937).
105. For the text of the proposed amendment, see 83 CoNo. REC. 405 (1938).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1937).
107. The sponsors of the Lea Amendments were persuaded that all of the various
types of section 12 offenses "could not justly be placed in one common mold for
the purpose of penalization." Id. at 6. They were thus convinced that application
of the harsher remedies provided in section 13(a) and section 14 required consideration of the nature of the particular offense lest the ordinary businessman find himself
dragged into court for some trivial or inadvertent offense. See note 91 supra. In
response to the proposal that penalties be established for all violations of section
12, Rep. Lea stated:
This is not the practical way to deal with businessmen. This is going to destroy
the principal virtue of the Federal Trade Commission procedure, which is to
give the honest businessman a chance to adjust his differences without harassing
or bringing him into court . . . . We are in a time when Congress should at
least be fair to the business of this country, and we cannot proceed on the
theory that every businessman is in a conspiracy to violate the law or racketeer.
83 CONG. REc. 406 (1938).
108. The House adopted the bill in January 1938. See 83 CoNo. REc. 424
(1938). It was approved by the Senate in March of the same year. See 83 CoNo.
REC, 8293 (1938).
109. The specific requirement of section 13(a) is that there be evidence of an
existing or imminent violation of section 12. See notes 5, 100 supra.
110. See text at note 16 & note 5 supra.
111. See text at note 25 supra.
112. 532 F.2d at 714.
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Before determining which of those standards Congress intended
to invoke through section 13(a), it would be useful first to consider
the extent· to which they are actually distinct. The Ninth Circuit in
Simeon, consistent with the directive of the Conference Report, defined the "probability of ultimate success" standard as requiring an
"independent judgment" by the court on an advertisement's falsity.11 3
Yet the Second Circuit in Sterling Drug had itself exercised such
"independent judgment," a fact acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit
in Simeon,11 4 in finding that the Commission had failed to establish
"reason to believe" that the advertisements there involved were
false.11 5 Nor did the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rhodes absolve
the courts from responsibility for an independent determination on
the "reason to believe" issue. Rather, it rejected reliance on the
traditionally stricter standards applicable to private litigation.116
Thus, it is not clear that requiring the Commission to demonstrate a
probability of ultimate success, as that phrase has been applied in
section 13 (a) proceedings, differs significantly from a requirement
that it demonstrate "reason to believe" that a particular advertisement
is false. Under either standard, the court's essential responsibility is
the same: to render an independent judgment as to whether a section
12 violation has occurred.
In any event, an interpretatlon of the "probability of ultimate
success" standard that places a significantly greater burden of persuasion upon the Commission than a "reason to believe" standard
would appear contrary to the purposes of section 13 (a) . Congress
intended section 13 (a) to provide an exception to the Commission's
otherwise remedial powers by enabling it to suppress immediately
a falsely advertised product that threatened the consuming public.117
A requirement that the Commission go substantially beyond a "reason to believe" showing before it could implement the injunction
procedure is inconsistent with the procedure's prophylactic purpose.
Moreover, the relationship section 13 (a) bears to the cease and
desist procedure is further evidence that Congress intended a "reason
to believe" standard. Since that procedure operates on the same
standard118 and since the Commission is authorized by section 13(a)
113. 532 F.2d at 713. See text at note 66 supra.
114. 532 F.2d at 713. See text at note 66 supra.
115. See text at note 36 supra.
116. See text at notes 20, 22 supra.
117. The procedure to be employed was described by Senator Wheeler as follows:
A complaint is lodged with the Federal Trade Commission. . . . If the
product is . . . one that might be injurious to the public, one which might cause
death, the Commission can immediately get a temporary injunction in the Federal court until such time as they can make a thorough investigation.
83 CONG. REc. 3290 (1938).
118. § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 4S(b) (Supp. V 197S), directs the Commission to issue
a complaint "[w]henever the Commission shall have reason to believe" that a viola-
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to seek an injunction pending its initiation of cease and desist proceedings, 119 it would be illogical to require the Commission to surpass
a "reason to believe" standard in -order to obtain an injunction.
With respect to the second issue presented by section 13 (a),
whether an injunction is in the public interest, the cases have divided
as to whether the court's independent consideration is required. The
Seventh Circuit has held that the Commission's demonstration of
"reason to believe" that an advertisement is false is sufficient in itself
to meet the public interest test. 120 The Ninth Circuit, however, has
gone beyond the falsity question to weigh the harm threatened by
the advertisement's continuation against the detrimental effects of
a preliminary injunction. 121
The Seventh Circuit's position is based upon two separate arguments already discussed briefly above: 122 first, that evidence of the
public interest in an injunction is automatically apparent from evidence that an advertisement misleads the public, and, second, that
determination of the public interest is primarily within the discretion
of the Commission. The first argument treats the two requirements
of section 13 (a) as indistinguishable: The issue of whether an
injunction would be in the public interest is thus transformed into a
question of whether discontinuing false advertisements is in the public
interest. Congress has presumably decided the latter question affirmatively by adopting section 12, declaring false advertisement of food
and drugs to be illegal. The section 13 (a) issue is different, however, for it involves not ultimate objectives but rather procedurea procedure that implicitly recognizes the balance between commercial and consumer interests struck by Congress in adopting the
Wheeler-Lea Act. By rejecting proposals to expand the remedies
of that Act123 or to transfer responsibility to the FDA,124 Congress
retained· the cease and desist procedure as the principal regulatory
mechanism in food and drug advertising. It thereby affirmed the
advertiser's right to remain free of the law's restraint absent a full
administrative and judicial determination that the challenged advertisement was false. 125 At the same time, by adopting section 13(a),
Congress mandated that the advertiser's procedural interest should
give way in appropriate circumstances to the consuming public's need
for protection from falsely advertised products.
tion of the act has occurred and it "appear[s] to the Commission that a proceeding
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public." See text at note 10
supra.
119. See note 16 supra.
120. See text at notes 25, 51 supra.
121. 532 F.2d at 714-16.
122. See text at notes 27, 28 supra.
123. See text at note 105 supra.
124. See text at notes 89-92 supra.
125. See notes 80, 82 supra.
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In section 13 (a) as originally formulated, those circumstances
were specifically identified since the procedure was limited to advertisement of products "imminently dangerous to health." 126 The public
interest requirement of the enacted statute serves a similar identifying
function, but, rather than limiting the remedy to specific enumerated
circumstances, it juxtaposes an injunction, and its consequent abrogation of procedural rights, with protection of the public and in that
way allows a weighing of the respective interests of advertiser and
consumer. Although evaluation of those interests is necessarily
dependent upon the particular circumstances of a given case, evidence
only that an advertisement is misleading is insufficient to establish
that an injunction is in the public interest. This result gives proper
value to Congress' commitment to the cease and desist procedure as
the principal method of prosecuting section 12 violations.
The second of the Seventh Circuit's arguments suggested that
whether an injunction was in the public interest was a j~dgment that
should be left to the Commission's discretion. That interpretation
of section 13 (a) effectively equates the standards for issuance of an
injunction with those governing the initiation of cease and desist
proceedings, since the prerequisites to a complaint are that the Commission have "reason to believe" that a violation of the FTC Act has
occurred and that it "appear" to the Commission that cease and
desist proceedings would be in the public interest. 127 The equation
is ill-conceived. First, and perhaps most obviously, the "public interest" requirement under section 13 (a) is concerned not with what
"appears" to the Commission but rather with whether the Commission has "reason to believe." More fundamentally, the questions refer
to different procedures. The Commission's issuance of a complaint is
merely a first step in its process of enforcement. A complaint places
the respondent under no restraint since there must be administrative
proceedings, followed by an opportunity for judicial review, before
a cease and desist order can take effect. A preliminary injunction
is drastically different since it places substantially the same restraint
upon the respondent as would a final cease and desist order, but can
be issued prior to any administrative proceedings. Thus, equating
the standards for issuance of an injunction and issuance of a complaint
gives the Commission uninhibited authority to decide whether an
advertisement will be restrained prior to, or only at the conclusion
of, the cease and desist procedure.
Whatever the merits of placing such authority in the Commission,
126. See note 102 supra.
127. See note 118 supra. That the Seventh Circuit intended to suggest the equation is indicated more forcefully by the fact that the court, in referring to the Commission's "broad discretion," cited FTC v. Klesner, discussed at note 10 supra, in
which the Supreme Court defined the nature of the "public interest" necessary to
support issuance of a complaint.
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Congress clearly did not intend that result when it adopted the
Wheeler-Lea Act. Congress rejected FDA regulation of food and
drug advertising largely because it feared giving too much discretionary power to an administrative agency. 128 The Commission was
considered procedurally fairer because of its adversarial administrative hearings and also because enforcement of its orders was postponed
until completion of judicial review.120 Having those perceptions,
Congress would have been unlikely to delegate to the Commission
authority to dispense with those procedures and preliminarily restrain
an advertiser. That conclusion is buttressed by an examination of
the ordering of judicial and administrative responsibilities established
by the Wheeler-Lea Act. Although those portions of the Act not
confined to food and drug advertising effected certain changes in
the Commission's jurisdiction and procedure, the basic structure established by the original FfC Act was retained. 130 Development
of cease and desist orders remained a function of the Commission's
administrative procedure, with actual enforcement awaiting completion of judicial review. 131 The one newly created exception empowered a federal court of appeals to enforce preliminarily a Commission order pending resolution of an appeal, 132 but the court was
directed to take that action only when "necessary in its judgment
to prevent injury to the public or to competitors."'133 In sum, the Act
provided that Commission orders, themselves the product of full
administrative hearings, would take effect prior to judicial review
only to the extent necessary, in the judgment of the court, to prevent
injury to the public or competitors.
Although section 12 offenses present a stronger case for preliminary enforcement, 134 it is likely, given congressional concern that
there be judicial supervision of the Commission's process of enforcement and that the procedural rights of the respondent be considered,130
that Congress intended the courts to consider whether the public interest required that an advertisement be preliminarily restrained under
13(a). Indeed, the legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Act leaves
little doubt that courts should form an independent judgment "that
128. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
129. See text at note 90 supra.
130. See text a£ note 95 supra.
131. See text at note 96 supra.
132. See text at note 97 supra.
133. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
134. Of course section 13(a) is limited to violations of section 12, unlike the
provisions of section 5(c), which would apply to any cease and desist order issued
by the Commission. Violations of section 12 are distinguished from violations of
other laws the Commission polices by the fact that they may cause physical as well
as pecuniary injuries. See note 102 supra.
135. See text at note 129 supra.
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issuance of an injunction is necessary and justified in the public
interest."136
This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent that application of section 13 (a) reflect the interests of the public as well
as the businessman. Since section 13 (a) was designed to provide
the Commission with an immediate remedy, it is evident, as was
concluded in Rhodes, that the statute operates on a "reason to believe" standard, with the Commission not being required to prove its
allegations conclusively but simply being obliged to establish them as
reasonably based in fact. That standard does not deprive the courts
of an independent role; rather it admonishes that section 13 (a) injunctions are for the protection of the public and that doubts should
be resolved in favor of the public. Contrary, however, to the Rhodes
decision, Congress did not intend the Court's inquiry to be limited to
the question of an advertisement's falsity. Implicit within the requirement that an injunction be in the public interest are the equitable
considerations that courts have traditionally weighed in determining
the appropriateness of preliminary relief. Thus, as was done in National Health Aids and Simeon, courts should balance the harm
threatened to the public by continuation of an advertisement against
the injury threatened to the advertiser by preliminary termination.
This balancing need only establish "reason to believe" that an injunction is in the public interest, and thus protection of the public should
be paramount in the evaluation.
136. See 83 CoNG. REc. 398-99 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece). Although
Representative Reece's comments are by far the most explicit expression of the intended role of the courts in the operation of section 13(a), they reflected the concerns expressed by others in Congress that procedural rights be observed. As Representative Reece stated:
The procedure which your committee has devised provides for due process
of law, and at the same time, through the injunction process, makes it possible
for the Commission to move with sufficient promptness to meet any emergency
situation that may arise. Under this procedure, necessary and constitutional
safeguards of property rights will be afforded. Before an injunction can issue,
first the Commssion, itself a quasi judicial body of five members, must be convinced that an emergency exists, and it in turn must convince the court of proper
jurisdiction of the existence of such emergency, and that issuance of an injunction is justified and necessary in the public interest.
83 CONG. REC. 398-99 (1938).
.

